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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mr. Mangum appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence to a unified
term of fourteen years, with five years fixed, for forgery of a financial transaction card.
(R., pp.242-44.) Specifically, Mr. Mangum challenges both the district court's denial of
his motion to dismiss the criminal information against him based on a violation of the
interstate agreement on detainers (hereinafter, lAD), as well as the district court's
refusal to suppress evidence gained from the execution of a search warrant predicated
on information and observations made by officers' unlawful entry into Mr. Mangum's
apartment.

This case involves consideration of two issues; the first requires a

determination of what triggers the 180 day speedy trial requirement of the interstate
agreement on detainers, while the second involves a determination of whether an
officer's uninvited entry into a defendant's home precludes the State from relying upon
the officer's observation of items in plain view to obtain a search warrant.
Mr. Mangum entered a conditional guilty plea to forgery of a financial transaction
card on August 17, 2010, preserving the right to appeal these issues if the district court
denied him relief on either ground.

(R., pp.204-216; 08/17/00 Tr., p.7, L.13 - p.24,

L.10.)1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings

lAD: On January 12, 2009, Mr. Mangum was charged by criminal complaint with
two counts of felony grand theft by unauthorized control, stemming from events

1 Because there are multiple separately bound transcripts in the record on appeal, the
transcripts will be referenced by the date of the hearing.
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occurring in Ada County November 7-8, 2008. (R., pp.8-9) At the time the complaint
was filed, Mr. Mangum was being held in custody in California and a copy of the arrest
warrant from Idaho, stemming from the complaint, was faxed by Ada County to the
Orange County Sheriff's Office on June, 7,2009. (R., pp.11-12,37-39.)

Upon learning

of the pending charges, Mr. Mangum wrote letters to the Ada County courts, beginning
in June and extending through December of 2009, asking to be extradited from
California to Idaho to resolve his case. (R., pp.11-22, 24-29, 31-32.)

Many of these

letters and requests were forwarded to the Ada County Prosecutor's office, including a
letter dated June 4, 2009 (R., p.11) and a Notice and demand for trial dated July 3,
2009. (R., p.19.) In addition, Mr. Mangum's father contacted the Ada County
Prosecutor's office on Mr. Mangum's behalf and received a return call from a deputy
prosecuting attorney advising him there was nothing the prosecutor could do to move
the process along, but that Mr. Mangum could contact the Ada County Sheriff's Office
and the California Department of Corrections.

(Defendant's Exhibit 0, admitted at

8/3/10 Tr., p.88, L.23-p.89, L.10; 8/10/10 Tr. p. 118, Ls.13-20.)
A status hearing was held in Mr. Mangum's absence on October 19, 2009.
(R., p.30.) At the hearing, the deputy prosecuting attorney indicated that Mr. Mangum is
in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and that the prosecutor had
been in contact with both the Department of Corrections and Mr. Mangum's public
defender.

(10/19/09 Tr., p.6, Ls.16-23.)

The prosecutor related that Mr. Mangum

"apparently has been given the forms to start the process to get back here," and "[e]very
couple of days I have been calling the Department corrections [sic], reminding them,
and they are telling me they are processing that." (10/19/09 Tr., p.6, L.25 - p.7, L.4.)
The prosecutor indicated that "[o]n our side, we will fill them out, do what we need to do,
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and get them in ourselves." (10/19/09 Tr., p.7, Ls.5-6.) The district court then summed
up its understanding of the proceedings thus far:
So, for the record, the status of the matter is this:
That
Mr. Mangum is in - - formally in the Department of Corrections for
California's custody. He has apparently been, according to Mr. Dinger,
given the proper forms for processing this matter under Idaho Code 195001, the interstate compact on detainers, and we anticipate receiving
additional forms from him.
In the meantime, the court will have a copy of the letter, the latest
correspondence from the defendant copied and forwarded to the
Prosecuting Attorney's office to your attention, Mr. Dinger.
(10/19/09 Tr., p.8, L.18 - p.9, L.6.) On December 16, 2009, Mr. Mangum filed a notice

of imprisonment and request for disposition, which was submitted by the prison facility
where he was being housed in Soledad, California to Ada County prosecutors.
(R., pp.35-36) Finally, on January 4, 2010, an lAD Evidence of Agents Authority to Act

for Receiving State, was signed by the Ada County Prosecutor requesting the transport
of Mr. Mangum from California to Idaho. (R., pp.33-34.)
Mr. Mangum appeared by video for arraignment on February 5, 2010, he was
appointed a lawyer and the matter was set for preliminary hearing on February 19,
2010. (R., pp.40-41.) According to minutes from the February 19th hearing, because the
public defender had a conflict of interest and new counsel needed to be appointed to
represent Mr. Mangum, the matter was reset for preliminary hearing on March 4, 2010.
(R., pp.47-48.) Conflict counsel entered a notice of appearance on February 23, 2010

and on March 4, 2010, the prosecutor filed an amended complaint alleging one count of
forgery of a financial transaction card, three counts of criminal possession of a financial
transaction card, and one count of misappropriation of personal identifying information,
all felony offenses. (R., pp.49-50, 54-56.) Mr. Mangum was arraigned on the Amended
Complaint on March 4, 2010 and waived his right to a preliminary hearing. (R., p.57.)
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A criminal information was filed and the matter was set for arraignment in district court
on March 16, 2010. (R., pp.58, 62-64.)

At the March 16, 2010 hearing, after

Mr. Mangum refused to waive his right to a speedy trial, a jury trial was scheduled to
begin May 12, 2010. (R., pp.65-68; 3/16/10 Tr., p.7, Ls.16-24.)
At the pretrial conference held on April 27, 2010, Mr. Mangum's trial was
rescheduled for August 9, 2010, to give the parties and the Court time to address
Mr. Mangum's pretrial motions, including the motion to dismiss under the lAD. (4/27/10
Tr., p.9, Ls.13-15; p.15, Ls.7-25.) Mr. Mangum declined to waive his right to speedy
trial. (4/27/10 Tr., p.11, L.17-p.12, L.18.)

The Court held hearings on Mr. Mangum's
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Motion to Dismiss due to an lAD violation on August 3 and 10, 2010. Subsequently,
Mr. Mangum entered a conditional guilty plea to forgery of a financial transaction card
on August 17, 2010, preserving the right to appeal his motion to dismiss if the district
court denied him relief on that ground. (R., pp.204-216; 08/17/00 Tr., p.7, L.13 - p.24,
L.10.) The district court then entered an order denying Mr. Mangum's Motion to Dismiss
under the lAD on September 27,2010, finding Mr. Mangum was given a trial date well
within the lAD requirements. (R., pp.229-234)

Entry Into Apartment: On November 10, 2008, investigators with the Idaho
Lottery Enforcement Division were

investigating

Roderick

Rainger Mangum

in

connection with the theft of lottery tickets and the purchase of gift cards with stolen and
fictitious credit card numbers, which gift cards were used to buy merchandise, including

Prior to the Motion hearings, Mr. Mangum filed his Motion to Dismiss, the State filed a
Response, and Mr. Mangum filed a Reply. (R., pp.73-74,78-77, 146-176, 179-183.) After
the Motion hearings, Mr. Mangum filed Supplemental Argument (R., pp.189-90) and
both parties submitted a stipulation regarding the evidence that was presented at the
hearings and the evidence the parties wanted the court to consider. (R., pp.196-197.)
2
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lottery tickets. (8/10/10 Tr., p.126, L.6 - p.130, L.2; p.139, L.5-p.140, L.13; Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) During their investigation, Idaho Lottery
investigators discovered Mr. Mangum had a warrant outstanding for his arrest in
California and contacted the U.S. Marshal's office to advise them they had a lead on
Mr. Mangum's whereabouts. (8/10/10 Tr., p.128, L.24 - p.129, L.12.) Officers with the
U.S. Marshal's office asked Idaho investigators to meet them at the address where it
was suspected Mr. Mangum was residing. (8/10/10 Tr., p.129, Ls.1-12.)
Four or five agents met Idaho officers at Mr. Mangum's suspected residence at
3132 Esquire. (8/10/10 Tr., p.129, Ls.6-12; 8/3/10 Tr., p.31, L.3 - p.32, L.17; 8/3/10
Tr., p.50, Ls.2-p.51, L.2.) Amber French, Deputy Director of the Enforcement Division
for the Idaho Lottery, made efforts to verify whether the apartment number they had for
Mr. Mangum was correct. (8/10/10 Tr., p.130, Ls.7-15.) The first apartment Ms. French
went to was not Mr. Mangum's apartment, but she was directed to another building in
the complex across the parking lot. (8/10/10 Tr., p.130, Ls.16-20.) En route to the
second apartment, Ms. French noticed a man at the dumpster holding a trash bag.
(8/10/10 Tr., p.130, Ls.20-25.) Ms. French and Detective Hazel, an investigator with the
Idaho Lottery, were walking across the parking lot together at the time and they both
suspected the man by the dumpster may be Mr. Mangum. (8/10/10 Tr. p.130 L.23 p.131, L.2.) The federal officers did not think the man by the dumpster was
Mr. Mangum, but chief deputy U.S. Marshal Platt decided to follow the man while
Ms. French proceeded to the second apartment. (8/10/10 Tr., p.131, Ls.15-24, p.147,
Ls.8-17.)
Mr. Platt followed and then approached the man, later identified as Mr. Mangum,
identified himself as being with the U.S. Marshalls, and asked Mr. Mangum if he was
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"Derrick." (8/10/10 Tr., p.148, L.s14-19.) Mr. Platt made up the name, which he does
routinely when looking for fugitives or people with active warrants, to de-escalate the
situation and put suspects at ease.

(8/10/10 Tr., p.159, Ls.2-22.)

Mr. Mangum

responded, "No. My name is Rod." (8/10/10 Tr., p.149, Ls.14-17.) When Mr. Platt told
Mr. Mangum he needed to see some identification, Mr. Mangum maintained that he was
not Derrick and he did not have any identification on him. (8/10/10 Tr., p.149, LS.1422.) Mr. Platt told Mr. Mangum "[w]ell, let's go in your apartment and get your 10[,]" and
when Mr. Mangum maintained he was not Derrick, "[w]ell, I'd like to see some 10, and
then I can prove that you're not Derrick, who we're looking for." (8/10/10 Tr., p.149,
L.23- p.150, L.5.) They started walking toward Mr. Mangum's apartment, which he
identified to Mr. Platt as "the one with open door." (8/10/10Tr., p.150, Ls.8-15.) When
they got to the apartment, Mr. Mangum kept saying "I'm not Derrick that you're looking
for. But, here, my 10 is on the table here. Let me find my wallet.,,3 (8/10/10 Tr., p.1S1,
Ls.2-7.)

According to Mr. Platt, Mr. Mangum walked into the apartment first and

Mr. Platt followed. (8/10/10 Tr., p.151, Ls.7-18.)
According to Ms. French, when she reached Mr. Mangum's apartment (the
second apartment), the door was open. (8/10/10 Tr, p.132, Ls.1-2.) Ms. French was
with another officer at the time and decided to knock on the door, announcing that she
was Amber French and she was from "ABC Realty." (8/10/10 Tr., p.132, Ls.3-7.) After
announcing her presence, Ms. French noticed there was cable guy in the apartment
installing cable. (8/10/10 Tr., p.132, Ls.8-9, p.132, Ls.13-14.) About five feet in front of

3 According to Mr. Platt, as he and Mr. Mangum were walking toward his apartment,
Mr. Mangum "kept telling me that he's not Derrick. And I kept saying, 'Well, just prove it
to me, and you can go.'" (8/10/10 Tr., p.154, Is.1-4.) Mr. Platt also testified that
Mr. Mangum told him, "Let's go back to my apartment and get my license. It's in my
wallet in my apartment." (8/10/10 Tr., p.160, Ls.10-13.)
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her inside the apartment, Ms. French noticed a kitchen table with a scanner or printer or
computer on it, as well as various credit cards.

(8/10/10 Tr., p.133, Ls.9-12, p.134,

Ls.1-17.) Ms. French believed the items on the table could be related to the Lottery
investigation. (8/10/10 Tr., p.142, Ls.6-13.)
Ms. French testified that Detective Hazel and the federal officers walked up
behind her with Mr. Mangum as she was knocking on the door. (8/10/10 Tr., p.133,
Ls.15-19, p.134, Ls.18-25.) Specifically, Ms. French noticed Detective Hazel, Mr. Platt,
and Mr. Mangum walking together toward the apartment. (8/10/10 Tr., p.134, Ls.18-25.)
Ms. French entered the apartment, but did not recall if she was the first person to go
inside: "when I saw them coming, they - I think we all went in at the - like I stepped in
front of them. I'm at the door, and they're up behind me. I stepped into the side, I'm
looking at the cable guy." (8/10/10 Tr., p.134, Ls.17-22.) Ms. French admitted that she
may have been the first person to enter Mr. Mangum's apartment. (8/10/10 Tr., p.136,
Ls.21-23.)

Mr. Platt testified that Mr. Mangum retrieved his wallet "off the table and

gives us the 10. And at that point, when he handed me the 10, I arrested him." (8/10/10
Tr., p.152, Ls.14-17.) Ms. French did not arrest Mr. Mangum, but saw other officers
take him to the ground, between the door and the kitchen table, inside the apartment.
(8/10/10 Tr., p.137, Ls.10-18.)
Mr. Mangum testified. He confirmed the events leading up to his encounter with
Mr. Platt were consistent with Ms. French's and Mr. Platt's testimony, except
Mr. Mangum recalled Mr. Platt pulling his weapon when he first approached
Mr. Mangum and asked if he was Derrick. (8/3/10 Tr., p.51, L.8 - p.53, L.45.) When
Mr. Mangum denied being Derrick and identified himself as Rod Mangum, Mr. Platt
advised he needed to confirm that by seeing Mr. Mangum's identification. (8/3/10
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Tr., p.53, Ls.1-16.)

When Mr. Mangum and Mr. Platt arrived at his apartment door,

Detective Hazel and Ms. French were already there. (8/3/10 Tr., p.53, Ls.17-24.) While
still outside the apartment, Mr. Mangum again repeated that he was not Derrick, and
Mr. Platt responded, U[w]e just need your ID. Where is your ID?" (8/3/10 Tr., p.53, L.25
- p.54, LA.) When Mr. Mangum told Mr. Platt his ID was "right in there" and pushed the
door open, Mr. Platt again asked where Mr. Mangum's ID was, and Mr. Mangum stated,
"My wallet is right there." (8/3/10 Tr., p.53, L.21 - p.55, L.5.) Mr. Platt then entered the
apartment, picked up a gift card off the table, then picked up the wallet after
Mr. Mangum advised him and the other officers that he wanted them out of his house if
they did not have a search warrant.

(8/3/10 Tr., p.55, L.7 - p.56, L.16.)

After

Mr. Mangum was placed under arrest, before a search warrant had been issued,
Detective Hazel and Ms. French "searched [his] house." (8/3/10 Tr., p.56, L.12 - p.57,
L.7.)
Mr. Mangum filed a motion to suppress evidence discovered during the officers'
unlawful entry into his apartment.

(R., pp.76-77, 148-151.)

Hearings on the motion

were held August 3 and 10, 2010, at which time the court heard testimony from
Mr. Platt, Ms. French, Mr. Mangum and Boise City police Detective Justin Kendall.
Subsequently on August 31, 2010, the Court issued a written decision denying
Mr. Mangum's motion to suppress, concluding Mr. Mangum had impliedly consented to
the officers' entry into his apartment. (R., pp.218-223.).
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Mangum's motion to dismiss
based on the State's failure to comply with the lAD's 180 day deadline?

2. Whether the district court erred in concluding Mr. Mangum impliedly consented to
law enforcement officers' warrantless entry into his apartment?

9

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Mangum's Motion To Dismiss Based On The
State's Failure To Comply With The 180 Day Deadline Under The Interstate Agreement
On Detainers

A.

Introduction
For more than six months, through a series of letters and one telephone call,

Mr. Magnum repeatedly asked judges of the Fourth Judicial District Court and Deputy
Ada County prosecutors to bring him back to Idaho to resolve the pending criminal
complaint against him. Despite these numerous requests, and despite the fact that a
fugitive hold from Ada County was placed on Mr. Mangum on May 22, 2009,
Mr. Mangum was not arraigned on the Ada County charges until February 5, 2010.
(R., pp.40, 90.)

The district court concluded that the timeline of the lAD was not

triggered until a formal detainer from Idaho was ultimately was lodged in California
against Mr. Mangum on December 16, 2009 and the formal notice was sent from the
California facility where Mr. Mangum was being held to the Ada County Prosecutor's
Office on December 28, 2009 (R., pp. 142-43,167, 233.) Mr. Mangum asserts that the
district court erred in failing to grant his motion to dismiss because both the prosecutor
and court had actual notice of Mr. Mangum's filing as early as August 28 th , but as late
as October 19, 2009, and Mr. Mangum substantially complied with the lAD.

B.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Mangum's Motion To Dismiss Based On
The State's Failure To Comply With The 180 Day Deadline Under The lAD
The district court erred in concluding that Mr. Mangum's right to a speedy trial, as

guaranteed by the lAD, was not invoked until two events occurred: (1) Idaho lodged a
formal detainer against Mr. Mangum in California; and (2) Idaho received formal notice
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from Mr. Mangum, through the California Warden's Office, requesting a speedy trial.
Based on these findings, the district court concluded that Mr. Mangum's speedy trial
rights under the lAD were not violated. As articulated below, Mr. Mangum asserts that
the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss.
The Federal Government, the District of Columbia, and forty-eight (48) states,
including Idaho, have entered into the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Alabama v.
Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148 (2001). The purpose of the lAD is set forth in the text of

the statute itself.
The agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and entered into
by this state [Idaho] with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the
form substantially as follows:
(a) The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner,
detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints,
and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated
in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of
prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the
party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the
expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination
of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried
indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find that
proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when
emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the
absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this
agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.
Idaho Code §19-5001 (a). In accordance with this purpose, the lAD creates uniform
procedures for expeditiously resolving pending charges and detainers against prisoners
in the party states. Specifically, the lAD provides that once a person
has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional
institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the
term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried
indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has
been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within on
hundred eighty (180) days after he shall have caused to be delivered to
the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting
officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his
11

request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or
complaint[.]
I.C. §19-5001 (c)(1). Because the lAD is a congressionally sanctioned compact, it falls
within the purview of the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution; it is a
federal law subject to federal construction. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000);
United States Constitution, Art. I, §10, c1.3. Both California and Idaho are parties to the
lAD agreement. I.C. §19-5001 (a); Cal Penal Code §1389 et seq.

1.

The District Court Erred In Concluding That Mr. Mangum's lAD Rights
Were Not Invoked Until Idaho, The Requesting State, Received Formal
Notice From California, The Sending State

After Mr. Mangum's arrest on November 10, 2008, he was transported to
California and incarcerated in the Orange County Jail pending resolution of the
California case that gave rise to his arrest. (R., p.11.) At least as of June 10,2009, and
as late as August 7, 2009, California authorities had no records reflecting a hold from
the State of Idaho for Mr. Mangum. (R., pp.130,132; Def.Ex.N.) Although Mr. Mangum
tried to invoke his lAD rights with respect to the Idaho charges on June 15, 2009, he
was advised by California authorities that he could not do so until he was sentenced in
California. (R., pp.137,139.) Mr. Mangum was sentenced to serve a prison sentence in
California on June 30, 2009, and was physically transferred to a prison facility on
July 22, 2009. (R., pp.93-94, 11 0, 229; 8/3/10 Tr., p.66, L.12 - p.67, LA.) On June 7,
2009, "T Bellizzi" from Ada County faxed an arrest warrant to "Orange Co. So., Ca." in
Ada County case CR-FE2009-000744, ordering Mr. Mangum be arrested and held on
$50,000 bond.

(R., pp.37-39.,88-89.)

For some reason, the warrant was not

considered a hold until September 11, 2009, when California Department of Corrections
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and Rehabilitation recognized the Ada County warrant. (R., p.140.) California did not
process the warrant until October 23,2009. (R., p.124)
In addressing Mr. Mangum's lAD challenge, the district court treated the warrant
as a formal detainer as of September 11, 2009, the date California apparently deemed
the warrant to be a detainer. (R., pp.140, 230.) The district court relied on testimony
offered at the August 3, 2010 hearing from Cindy McDonald, the interstate coordinator
for the Idaho Department of Correction, for its conclusion that a warrant does not
constitute a detainer. (R., p.230). Ms. McDonald testified that the lAD procedure varies
from state to state, but that in her experience in Idaho, a hold is placed on an offender
for tried charges, probation violations, and parole violations.

(8/3/10 Tr., p.27, L.16-

p.28, L.9.) According to Ms. McDonald, the hold tells the prison "this agency would like
to take custody of this individual when they're released. But the paperwork does not fall
within the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, so they cannot initiate the [lAD] while he's
[sic] in our custody." (8/3/10 Tr., p.28, Ls.2-9.) Ms. McDonald defined a detainer as "a
certified information, complaint, or indictment with a request to place a detainer. That's
how I accept the paperwork for a detainer. And they're for untried charges, felony
charges."

(8/3/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.9-12 (emphasis added).)

When the Court asked

Ms. McDonald what happens when a hold is the result of an arrest warrant on pending
felony charges, she responded:
Some agencies will do that. And usually when we place a hold for that, the
reason we place the hold instead of possibly a detainer is because
the inmate is going to be paroling within a short period of time or
discharging his Idaho sentence, and the time frame for the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers is not applicable for placing a detainer against
him. Because once you place a detainer and the person goes to the other
jurisdiction, they go to the receiving state. Once they're finished with all of
their charges, they have to be sent back to the sending state.
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If they're paroling or they're discharging, we don't want them back.
So that's why occasionally, if it's untried charges, we'll place a hold
because there's imminent release from prison.
(8/3/10 Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.29, L.11 (emphasis added).)

Thus, Ms. McDonald's

testimony seems to be that warrants based on untried felony charges can be
considered detainers, depending on the length of the remaining prison sentence.
The United States Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that documents other
than those explicitly labeled "detainers" may trigger the protection of the lAD. In United
States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 349 (1978), the Supreme Court considered whether the

lAD is triggered when the United States uses the writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum (hereinafter, Writ) to obtain custody of state prisoners. The Court noted

the Writ, including its historical role and function, "bear little resemblance to the typical
detainer which activates the provisions of the [lAD] Agreement." Id. at 357.
In distinguishing the Writ from an lAD detainer, the Court recognized the
following characteristics of a detainer: (1) it can be lodged against a prisoner at the
behest of the prosecutor or law enforcement officer without judicial review; (2) it does
not require the immediate presence of a prisoner but instead serves to put institution
officials on notice that a prisoner is wanted by another jurisdiction "upon his release
from prison"; and (3) further action is required by the receiving State to obtain the
prisoner. Id. at 358. Although the lAD does not define a detainer, House and Senate
reports relating to the lAD explain the detainer is "a notification filed with the institution
in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending
criminal charges in another jurisdiction." Id. at 359 (citations omitted). In contrast, Writs
are immediately executed, they are issued by a federal court, and they have a long
history dating back to the first judiciary act. Id. at 360-61. Given these differences, the
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problems the lAD sought to eliminate do not arise with the Writ. Thus, the Court held
that a Writ is not a detainer for purposes of the lAD. Id. at 361.
For the same reasons the Mauro Court found the Writ was not a detainer for lAD
purposes, a warrant is a detainer for lAD purposes; it can be lodged against a prisoner
at the behest of the prosecutor or a law enforcement officer; it does not require the
immediate presence of a prisoner but instead puts institution officials on notice that a
prisoner is wanted by another jurisdiction "upon his release from prison"; and finally,
additional action is required before the receiving State can obtain the prisoner. Id. at
358.

The warrant and the detainer are thus indistinguishable in their effect for lAD

purposes.
This point was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Carchman v.
Nash, 473 U.S. 716,727 (1985). In Carchman, the Court determined the plain language

of the lAD, as well as its legislative history, reflected that the lAD was intended only to
apply to detainers premised on untried indictments, informations or complaints, thereby
excluding detainers based on probation violations.

Id. at 726-27.

In reaching this

conclusion, the Court cited to the lAD drafters' definition of a detainer under the lAD: "A
detainer may be defined as a warrant filed against a person already in custody with the
purposes of insuring that he will be available to the authority which has placed the
detainer." Id. at 727 (quoting Suggested State Legislation, Program for 1957, p.74).
While agreeing with this definition and the fact that a detainer could arise from parole or
probation violations, the Court determined that by its own terms, the lAD did not apply to
all detainers, only those arising from untried indictments, informations or complaints. Id.
The warrant in Mr. Mangum's case was signed by the magistrate after receiving
a complaint, under oath, from the deputy prosecutor, alleging Mr. Mangum committed
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two counts of felony grand theft by unauthorized control, in violation of I.C. §§ 1B2403(3), 1B-2407(1)(b). (R., pp.BB-B9.) By its own terms, the warrant gave notice that it
was premised on an untried complaint against Mr. Mangum for two felony grand theft
counts. See Pyzer v. State, 109 Idaho 376 (Ct. App. 1985) (a warrant and request for
extradition may constitute a detainer under I.C. §19-5001); cf State v. Smith, 119 Idaho
11, 12 (Ct. App. 1990) (where defendant failed to establish a warrant for extradition was
issued and served on Wyoming authorities demanding his appearance in Idaho,
defendant's wavier of extradition did not trigger the lAD).
As a result, the district court erred in considering the date California began
treating the warrant as a detainer to be the date of the detainer; instead, the date of the
detainer is the date Mr. Mangum had a warrant outstanding against him in Idaho (Ada
County), and was serving a sentence in a state prison: July 22, 2009. See I.C. §195001 (c)(1) (once a person "has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or
correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term
of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the
prisoner .... "); Brewer v. State, 128 Idaho 340, 343 (Ct. App.1996) (defendant became
eligible for protections under the lAD only upon being placed in prison, but not while in
county jail); State v. Breen, 126 Idaho 305, 308 (Ct. App. 1994) ("[T]he I.A.D. governs
only when the defendant is serving a sentence in prison."). For these reasons, much
like a prematurely filed notice of appeal (Idaho Appellate Rule 17; Weller v. State, 146
Idaho 652, 653-54 (Ct. App. 200B)), the warrant should be treated as a ripe, or
perfected detainer, as of the date Mr. Mangum began serving his prison sentence in
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California: July 22, 2009. (R., pp.37-39.,88-89, 122; 8/3/10 Mot. Hrg. Tr., p.66, L.12 p.67, L.4.)

2.

The District Court Erred In Concluding That Mr. Mangum's lAD Rights
Were Not Triggered Until The Prosecutor Received Formal Notice Of
Mr. Mangum's Disposition Request

Although a detainer is a necessary predicate for application of the lAD, the 180
day speedy trial right is not triggered until the prosecuting attorney and appropriate
court receive notice of an inmate's request for final disposition of the pending charges.
I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(1). The district court concluded that despite Mr. Mangum's written
requests to the district court and Ada County prosecutor's office, the lAD's 180 day
speedy trial right was not triggered until the Ada County prosecutor received formal
notice of Mr. Mangum's request to resolve the pending charges from the California
Warden's office on December 28, 2009. (R., pp.167, 233.)
As previously noted, the lAD requires that when a person serving a prison
sentence has an
untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a
detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial
within one hundred eighty (180) days after he shall have caused to be
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the
prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his
imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the
indictment, information or complaint[.] . .. The request of the prisoner
shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having
custody of the prisoner, stating the term of the commitment under which
the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to
be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of
parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole
agency relating to the prisoner.

Mr. Mangum was received by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation on
July 22, 2009, at the Wasco State Prison. (R., p.122) He was later transferred to
another California prison, the Correctional Training Facility, on October 19, 2009.
(R., p.124.)

4
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I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(1).
Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Mangum sent numerous letters to the appropriate
court and the Ada County prosecutor's office asking for a speedy trial and invoking the
lAD. (R., pp.229-30.) It is also undisputed that Mr. Mangum invoked his constitutional
right to a speedy trial and could do so by these written requests.

See, e.g., Smith v

Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969) (upon a defendant's demand, states have a
constitutional duty to make a good faith, diligent effort to bring the defendant to trial).
Mr. Mangum testified and the State did not dispute that while he was in custody
in California, first in the Orange County Jail and then later the Wasco State Prison and
the Soledad Correctional Training Facility, he sent a number of letters, some certified, to
both the court and the prosecutor's office seeking resolution of the pending Idaho
charges. (8/3/10 Tr. p.57, L.15 - p.67, L.4; R., pp.95-109.) Mr. Mangum completed a
"notice and demand for trial," which he addressed to the Ada County prosecutor's office,
identifying his location in Wasco State Prison for the offense of commercial burglary,
identifying the charge pending against him in Idaho, including the warrant number and
County; Mr. Mangum submitted proof of service of the notice, which was mailed on
August 21,2009 and received by the Court on August 28,2009. (R., pp.110-111.)
These documents were mailed by Mr. Mangum, while he was in prison, to the
prosecutor's office and were also routed by the court to the prosecutor's office on
September 1, 2009. (R., pp.95-1 00,111.) At a status hearing held in Mr. Mangum's
absence on October 19, 2009, Mr. Dinger, an Ada County Deputy Prosecutor was
present and the issues of the detainer, Mr. Mangum's custody status, and the State's
and the court's knowledge of these issues were addressed. (R., p.30; 10/19/09 Tr., p.6,
L.25 - p.7, L.4 (Mr. Dinger informing the Court that Mr. Mangum is in the custody of the
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California Department of Corrections and that he (Mr. Dinger) had been in contact with
both the Department of Corrections and Mr. Mangum's public defender).)
Thus, as early as August 28th , but as late as October 19, 2009, both the court
and the prosecutor's office had all of the information necessary under the lAD to
address Mr. Mangum's request to have his Ada County charges resolved. Moreover,
the negative effects of the detainer were felt by Mr. Mangum on October 23, 2009, when
he was removed from general population and placed in Administrative Segregation
based solely on the Ada County warrant. (Defendant's Exhs. J-K.)
The requirements necessary for a prisoner to invoke the protections of the lAD
include: (1) a written detainer; (2) written notice to the appropriate court of the
prosecuting officer's jurisdiction of the place of the prisoner's incarceration; (3) a request
for a final disposition of the pending indictment, information or complaint; (4) a certificate
of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner stating the term of the
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of
parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to
the prisoner. Idaho Code §19-5001(c)(1). One of the primary purposes of passage of
the lAD was to minimize the adverse effects detainers had upon prisoners: "[b]ecause a
detainer remains lodged against a prisoner without any action being taken on it, he is
denied certain privileges within the prison, and rehabilitation efforts may be frustrated."
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 360 (1978). In so seeking to achieve the lAD's
intended purpose, the Idaho Legislature instructed the reviewing court that "This
agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purpose."
Code § 19-5001 (i)
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Idaho

As discussed above, a written detainer was issued for Mr. Mangum. Thereafter,
through his written notices to the Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County, and written
notices to the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's office, Mr. Mangum identified his
place of confinement, including an address, and requested final disposition of the
pending complaint against him, even including the correct case number.

While this

information was submitted by Mr. Mangum, not the California Warden's office, proper
information was conveyed to the correct parties. The State did not claim it lacked notice
that Mr. Mangum wanted to resolve the Ada County charges, that it had no idea where
Mr. Mangum was being held in prison in California, the length of his California prison
sentence, his parole eligibility, or good time/credit for time served; rather the State only
claimed that it lacked receipt of proper forms, which it received December 28, 2009.
(R., pp.172-176.)
In Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43 (1993), the United States Supreme Court
considered whether the 180 day time period under the lAD is triggered by the date the
inmate's request for disposition is received by the prosecutor in the receiving state, or
the date the request for disposition is received by the warden in the sending state. In
Fex, the petitioner was serving a sentence in an Indiana prison when he received notice

of a detainer lodged by Michigan. Id. at 46. He gave Indiana prison officials a request
for final disposition of the Michigan charges on September 7, 1988, and the prison
mailed the request on September 22. Id. The request was received by the Michigan
court and prosecutor on September 26, and the petitioner was brought to trial on March
22, 1989, 177 days after his request was received by Michigan officials, but 196 days
after his request was delivered to Indiana prison official. Id.

The petitioner claimed the

180 day time period under the lAD was triggered when he delivered his request for
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disposition to prison officials, not the day the request was received by Michigan officials,
and moved to dismiss the Michigan charges based on a violation of the lAD. Id.
The outcome of the Petitioner's claim was contingent upon interpretation of the
following language in the lAD: "within one hundred and eighty days after he shall have
caused to be delivered." Id. at 47.

The Court first rejected outright the petitioner's

contention that mere transmittal of the lAD request to prison authorities commences the
180 day period, irrespective of whether the request is ever received by the receiving
State. Id. at 47-48. The Court then considered the more difficult question of whether
the 180 day period must be computed from the date the request is transmitted to prison
authorities, or from the date when delivery is actually made to the receiving State, Id. at
48.
The Court rejected the former interpretation, noting that it was "more reasonable
to think that the receiving State's prosecutors are in no risk of losing their case until they
have been informed of the request for trial."

Id. at 50.

The Court relied on other

portions of the lAD for its conclusion "that the receiving State's receipt of the request
starts the clock."

Id. at 51.

Most significant for the Court was the lAD's provision

requiring the Warden to forward the request "by registered or certified mail, return
receipt requested." Id. The Court found it particularly compelling that the lAD provides
for documentary evidence of the date the request is delivered to officials in the receiving
State, but provides no such record for proving the date on which a prisoner transmits
the request to prison officials. Id. The Court thus held the 180 day time period under
the lAD "does not commence until the prisoner's request for final disposition of the
charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of
the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him." Id. at 52. The decision in Fex
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emphasizes the importance of the court and prosecutor in a receiving State that issues
a detainer against a prisoner receiving actual notice of the request for disposition under
the lAD.
A review of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of lAD is also instructive.

See

State v. Johnson, 196 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 1999). The Johnson Court was concerned

with whether a letter, sent to the district court by the prisoner's public defender notifying
the court of Johnson's invocation of his lAD right, substantially complied with the
"written notice" of lAD. Id. 196 F.3d at 1004. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the letter
satisfied the requirements under lAD as it was "undisputed that the public defender's
letter to the court contained the information required by the lAD to be conveyed to the
district court, for the letter expressly stated that Johnson was serving a sentence in the
state of Washington and that he requested a speedy trial.

Id.

Likewise, in United

States v. Berg,S the prisoner, Berg, had mailed a letter, entitled "Demand for Speedy

Trial," which referenced the lAD, to both the prosecuting U.S. Assistant Attorney and
court. Id. at 1. A few months later, Berg mailed a second "Demand for Speedy Trial" to
the prosecutor and the court. Id.

In both filings Berg "listed his address as the New

Mexico Department of Corrections in Clayton, New Mexico and demanded that there be
timely disposition of the pending federal charge pursuant to the lAD." Id. The Court
concluded that Berg's filing substantially complied with lAD:
it seems clear that the defendant's demands for a speedy trial
substantially complied with the information required under the lAD. Both of
the filings sent to the court and the U.S. Attorney's office were captioned
with his name and the correct case number and were titled "DEMAND
FOR SPEEDY TRIAL." ... They expressly stated that the defendant was
requesting a speedy trial under the lAD. In the second letter dated
January 11, 2011, he also indicated that he was "sentenced and in
custody."
5

U.S. v. Berg, 2011 WL 3471216 (D. Guam 2011).
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Id. at 4.
Here, like in Johnson and Berg, there is no question the proper court and the
proper prosecuting agency that had lodged the detainer against Mr. Mangum received
actual notice of Mr. Mangum's request for disposition as of August 28, 2009, which is
confirmed by certified mail receipts, and that Mr. Mangum substantially complied with
the lAD. (R., pp.95-101.) Moreover, both the court's and the prosecutor's actual notice
and knowledge of the request for disposition is clear from a review of the transcript of
the hearing held in Mr. Mangum's absence before Magistrate Judge Hicks on
October 19, 2009. (See 10/19/09 Tr., p.6, L.16 - p.?, L.4.) In fact, at the hearing the
deputy prosecutor acknowledged that he had been in contact with the California
Department of Corrections and Mr. Mangum's California Public Defender and that
Mr. Mangum "has been in the custody of the Department of Corrections there for a
couple weeks now.... " (10/19/09 Tr., p.6, L.16 - p.8, L.17.)
Indeed, no one appears to dispute that both the court and the prosecutor's office
had actual knowledge and notice of both the detainer and Mr. Mangum's repeated
requests for speedy resolution of the pending charges.

The Idaho Legislature has

mandated that the lAD "shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purpose."
Idaho Code § 19-5001(i). It would subvert the purpose of the lAD if the agency which
issued the detainer and received actual notice of an inmate's desire to resolve the
detainer were allowed to claim ignorance until receiving formal notice of the inmate's
request for final disposition. This is precisely what the prosecutor asked and precisely
what the district court ordered. The district treated December 28, 2009, the date the
Ada County Prosecutor's office received formal notice from the California Warden of
Mr. Mangum's formal request to initiate proceedings under the lAD, as the triggering
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date for the 180 day deadline.

(R., pp.167, 233.)

As such, the district court erred

finding that a lAD was not triggered until a formal detainer from Idaho was ultimately
was lodged in California against Mr. Mangum on December 16, 2009 and the formal

notice was sent from the California facility where Mr. Mangum was being held because
Mr. Mangum had provided actual notice to both the court and prosecutor of his intent to
invoke the provisions of I.C. § 19-5001.

3.

Mr. Mangun Substantially Complied With The Certificate Of Status Of
Inmate Requirement Of I.C. § 19-5001

As set forth above, I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(1) provides:
The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the
appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of the
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already
served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of
good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any
decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.
I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(1). The purpose of the certificate of status is to "allow[] the
prosecutor to make a rational decision whether to prosecute and the State may, for
example, decline to prosecute upon learning the prisoner is already serving a lengthy
sentence elsewhere on a more serious charge." State v.' Moe, 581 N.W.2d 468, 471472 (N.D. 1998). Both the Ninth Circuit and the Idaho Legislature mandate that the lAD
statute must be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose. See State v. Johnson, 196
F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 1999); Idaho Code § 19-5001(i).

Thus, the question before this

Court is whether Mr. Mangum substantially complied with I.C. § 19-5001.
Mr. Mangum asserts that he substantially complied with I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(1) as
he provided all of the information needed for the prosecutor to make a decision to
prosecutor his case, i.e. his term of the commitment, the time he has already served,
the time remaining to be served on the sentence, his good time credit, and his
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approximate parole eligibility date.

(See R., pp.11-15.)

Idaho courts have not yet

addressed this issue so we must look to other jurisdictions for guidance. See U. S. v.
Berg, 2011 WL 3471216 (D. Guam 2011); United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180 (3
1998); State V. Roberts, 427 SO.2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. (1983); State

V.

rd

Cir.

Smith, 858

F.2d 416 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). In Dent, the defendant sent a letter to the federal district
court in Pennsylvania requesting a speedy resolution of his outstanding federal charges
while incarcerated in New York State on unrelated charges. Id. 149 F.3d at 183, 186.
Dent's letter identified his current place of incarceration, but did not reference the lAD or
include the information which must accompany the request. Id. at 186. Dent argued
that his letter invoked the lAD and that the "government already possessed most of the
necessary information concerning his case and his noncompliance was solely the fault
of the New York state penal authorities." Id. In finding that Dent did not substantially
comply with the lAD requirements, the Court observed that "Dent's letter did not include
his term of confinement, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on his
sentence, or any information concerning good-time credits or parole eligibility as
required by Article III." Id. at 187.
In Smith, the defendant, while incarcerated in Texas, sent a letter to New Mexico
authorities attempting to invoke lAD.

Id. 858 P.2d at 417-420.

Smith's letter gave

authorities notice of his prior incarceration in Texas and unlike the defendant in Dent,
expressly requested lAD processing. Id. at 420. Smith argued that his letter provided
New Mexico authorities of "actual notice" sufficient to trigger the time requirements of
lAD. Id. The Smith Court held that although Smith did not have to provide the actual
certificate inmate statute to substantially comply with lAD, "he did have an obligation to
furnish the information that would be contained therein."
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Id.

Similarly, in State

V.

Roberts, supra, the Florida District Court of Appeal held the defendant, Roberts, was

entitled to lAD relief even though he did not provide authorities with a formal certificate
of inmate statute because he submitted a memorandum that stated his "jail credit time,
a conditional early release date, a maximum incarceration date and a parole eligibility
date." Id. at 789-790. The Roberls Court observed, "If a prisoner makes a good faith
effort to bring himself within the Agreement's operation, and omits nothing essential to
the Agreement's operation, then his failure of strict compliance will not deprive him of its
benefits."

Id. at 790 (quoting State ex reI. Saxton v. Moore, 598 S.W.2d 586, 590

(Mo. App. 1980), see also U.S. v. Berg, 2011 WL 3471216 (D. Guam 2011) (finding that
the defendant had substantially complied with the certificate of inmate status
requirement by demanding a speedy resolution of his pending federal charge and
providing the address of the New Mexico Department of Corrections where he was
currently serving his sentence.)
In the instant case, in additional to providing actual notice to both the court and
prosecuting attorney of his request to invoke the lAD, Mr. Mangum provided authorities
with his California case number (08CF-2945), his term of the commitment (5 years), the
time he has already served (233 days), the time remaining to be served on the
sentence, his good time credit (116 days), and his approximate parole eligibility date
(August of 2012).

(R., pp.11-15.) Additionally, at least as of October 19, 2009, the

prosecutor was well aware of Mr. Mangum's location and been in contact with both the
California Department of Corrections and Mr. Mangum's California attorney. (10/9/09
Tr., p.6, L.16 - p.8, L.17.) It is also apparent that the Ada County Deputy Prosecutor
had also decided that Mr. Mangum's case was going to be prosecuted as evidenced by
his statements to the court on October 19, 2009. (10/9/09 Tr., p.8, Ls.12-18 (stating
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that California has "given him the forms that he needs to fill out to get this going, and so
we are just waiting to receive those so we can do what we can from out end.".)
Given Mr. Mangum's substantial compliance with the lAD, as well as both the
prosecutor's and the court's actual knowledge of Mr. Mangum's desire to resolve the
outstanding detainer, the triggering date for the 180 day time limit should commence on
the date Mr. Mangum's request for disposition were received by to the Ada County
Prosecutor's office and the Ada County Court Clerk's office, as evidenced by the
certified mail receipts: August 28, 2009. As of this date, Mr. Mangum was incarcerated
in a California prison; he had provided the prosecutor's office and the court clerk's office
with all relevant and necessary information under the lAD to permit the State to secure
his return to Idaho.
The State's failure to bring Mr. Mangum to trial by February 24,2010, 180 days
after receipt of Mr. Mangum's request for disposition, requires dismissal of the charges
in the instant matter with prejudice.

Even assuming Mr. Mangum's request that the

district court consider his motions to dismiss and suppress tolled the 180 day period,
because this request happened long after the 180 day period had already expired, the
district court erred in concluding that Mr. Mangum received a trial date within the 180
day period, that any delays beyond that period were attributable to him, and as a result,
his rights under the lAD were not violated.
Mr. Mangum asks this Court to vacate the district court's order denying his
motion to dismiss and remand his case to the district court for the entry of an order
dismissing the instant matter with prejudice. I.C. § 19-5001. In the event this Court
does not order dismissal of Mr. Mangum's case based on a violation of the lAD,
because the district court erred in denying Mr. Mangum's motion to suppress evidence
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that was gained as a result of officers' unlawful entry into his apartment, this Court
should reverse the district court's order denying the motion to suppress and remand
Mr. Mangum's case for further proceedings.

II.
The District Court Erred In Concluding Mr. Mangum Impliedly Consented To Officers'
Entry Into His Apartment

A.

Introduction
Observations made by law enforcement officers who arrested Mr. Mangum in his

apartment provided probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to search
Mr. Mangum's apartment, which in turn formed the basis for the charges against
Mr. Mangum in the instant matter. The officers' entry into the apartment was without
Mr. Mangum's consent and was thus unlawful, rendering the officers' observations a
product of an unlawful entry and presence. The district court's denial of Mr. Mangum's
Motion to Suppress based on its conclusion that Mr. Mangum impliedly consented to the
entry is erroneous and contrary to the evidence.

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

Idaho appel/ate courts defer to the trial court's factual findings which are not clearly
erroneous; factual findings supported by substantial competent evidence are not clearly
erroneous.

State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485 (2007) (citing State v. Klingler, 143

Idaho 494, 495-96 (2006)); State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 374 (Ct. App. 2009).
However, a trial court's legal conclusions and whether constitutional requirements have
been satisfied based on the facts found are freely reviewed. Id.
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C.

The District Court Erred In Concluding Mr. Mangum Impliedly Consented To
Officers Entry Into His Apartment
Mr. Mangum neither expressly nor impliedly consented to law enforcement

officers' entry into his apartment.

As such, all evidence gained as a result of that

unlawful entry, including any observations of items in plain view, must be suppressed.
The district court's conclusion that by his words and conduct, Mr. Mangum impliedly
consented to the officers' entry is not supported by substantial evidence and is thus
clearly erroneous.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution demands "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]" U.S. Const. amend IV.
Warrantless searches and seizure are presumptively unreasonable. State v. Anderson,
140 Idaho 484,486 (2004). While it is true that numerous exceptions have been carved
out to permit both warrantless seizures and searches, the State bears the burden of
proving a warrantless search or seizure falls within a well-established exception to the
warrant requirement. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482,485 (2007).
Evidence found in plain view is an exception to the warrant requirement.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). The plain view exception to the

warrant requirement must meet specific standards to be applicable. An officer must be
in a place he or she is lawfully entitled to be at the time the item in plain view is
observed, and the evidentiary value or illegal nature of the item observed must be
immediately apparent. Id. at 466; see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)
(dispensing with inadvertence requirement of discovery of item in plain view, but
otherwise affirming plain view exception announced in Coolidge).
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Consent is also a well-established exception to the warrant requirement. Smith,
144 Idaho at 488. The State bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of
the evidence that consent was voluntarily given, rather than the product of duress or
coercion, direct or implied.

Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 221 (1973);

State v. Jaborrra, 143 Idaho 94,97 (Ct. App. 1994). The voluntariness of consent must
be assessed by consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
consent. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,201 (2002). Consent may be granted
explicitly by words, or implicitly by gestures or conduct. State v. Moran-Soto, 150 Idaho
175,180 (Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted). However, acquiescence to a claim of lawful
authority is not consent and does not satisfy the state's burden of showing that consent
has been freely and voluntarily given. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
Here the district court concluded that Mr. Mangum impliedly consented to officers
entering his apartment by telling officers "let's go back to my apartment to get my
license."

(R., p.222.)

The district court discounted the fact that officers escorted

Mr. Mangum back to his apartment, and found it was reasonable for Mr. Platts to
believe Mr. Mangum was cooperative and therefore consenting, because it was in
Mr. Mangum's "best interest to get identification to prove his identity to the officers."
(R., p.222.) The finding of consent rendered the officer's observation of items of

possible evidentiary value in plain view lawful. (R., p.223.) The district court's analysis
fails to consider the full testimony of Marshal Platts, Ms. French, Mr. Mangum and
Justin Kendall.
As previously noted, Mr. Platt testified that when he told Mr. Mangum he needed
to see some identification, Mr. Mangum maintained that he was not Derrick and he did
not have any identification on him. (8/10/10 Tr., p.149, Ls.14-22.) Mr. Platt responded
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by telling Mr. Mangum "[w]ell, let's go in your apartment and get your 10[,]' and when
Mr. Mangum maintained he was not Derrick, "[w]el/, I'd like to see some 10, and then I

can prove that you're not Derrick, who we're looking for."

(8/10/10 Tr., p.149, L.23-

p.150, L.5 (emphasis added).) According to Mr. Platt, as he and Mr. Mangum were
walking toward his apartment, Mr. Mangum "kept telling me that he's not Derrick. And I
kept saying, 'Well, just prove it to me, and you can go.'" (8/10/10 Tr., p.154, Is.1-4
(emphasis added).)

Mr. Platt tried to put a better spin on the events later in his

testimony, claiming Mr. Mangum told him, "Let's go back to my apartment and get my
license. It's in my wallet in my apartment[,]" (8/10/10 Tr., p.160, Ls.10-13), and ''I'm not
Derrick that you're looking for. But, here, my ID is on the table here. Let me find my
wallet." (8/10/10 Tr., p.151, Ls.2-7.) According to Mr. Platt, Mr. Mangum walked into
the apartment first and Mr. Platt followed. (8/10/10 Tr., p.151, Ls. 7-18.)
According to Ms. French, when she reached Mr. Mangum's apartment, the door
was open. (8/10/10 Tr, p.132, Ls.1-2.) Ms. French was with another officer at the time
and decided to knock on the door, announcing that she was Amber French and she was
from "ABC Realty." (8/10/10 Tr., p.132, Ls.3-7.) According to Ms. French, Detective
Hazel and the federal officers walked up behind her with Mr. Mangum as she was
knocking on the door. (8/10/10 Tr., p.133, Ls.15-19; p.134, Ls.18-25.)

Specifically,

Ms. French noticed Detective Hazel, Mr. Platt, and Mr. Mangum walking together
toward the apartment.

(8/10/10 Tr., p.134, Ls.18-25.)

Ms. French entered the

apartment, but did not recall if she was the first person to go inside: "when I saw them
coming, they - I think we all went in at the - like I stepped in front of them. I'm at the
door, and they're up behind me. I stepped into the side, I'm looking at the cable guy."
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(8/10/10 Tr., p.134, Ls.17-22.) Ms. French admitted that she may have been the first
person to enter Mr. Mangum's apartment. (8/10/10 Tr., p.136, Ls.21-23.)
Considering the totality of the circumstances, looking only at the testimony of
Ms. French and Mr. Platt, the State did not establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that Mr. Mangum voluntarily consented to the officers' entry into his
apartment.

Ms. French's testimony, coupled with that of Mr. Platt, reflects that

Mr. Mangum was surrounded by at least three law enforcement officers by the time he
reached the threshold of his apartment. In addition, Ms. French testified that she may
have entered Mr. Mangum's apartment first and she did not testify that she had his
consent to do so.

Finally, Mr. Platt's own testimony demonstrates that he told

Mr. Mangum he had to prove he was who he said he was by showing Mr. Platt his
identification before Mr. Platt would let Mr. Mangum go; Mr. Platt also made it clear he
would not take no for an answer and would not accept anything short of seeing
Mr. Mangum's identification as proof of his identity.
In addition, taking into account Mr. Mangum's testimony further demonstrates
that Mr. Mangum did not consent to the officers' entry into his apartment, either implicitly
or explicitly.

Mr. Mangum testified that Mr. Platt initially drew his weapon, asked for

Mr. Mangum's name, and then advised Mr. Mangum if he was who he said he was,
everything would be fine.

(8/3/10 Tr., p.52, L.8-p.53, L.16.)

Mr. Platt escorted

Mr. Mangum back to his apartment and continued to insist on seeing Mr. Mangum's
identification, despite Mr. Mangum's protestations that he was not "Derrick." (8/3/10
Tr., p.53, L.12 -p.54, L.25.) When they reached the apartment, Mr. Platt entered while
Mr. Mangum was still outside, picked items up off the kitchen table and asked
Mr. Mangum about them, and then pulled Mr. Mangum's identification out of his wallet
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and placed him under arrest. (8/3/10 Tr., p.55, 1.7-p.56, L.16.) The district court did not
discount Mr. Mangum's recitation of events and did not deem his testimony to lack
credibility. (R., p.223.)
Mr. Mangum's acquiescence to the officers' apparent authority does not
constitute voluntarily consent. Mr. Mangum did not consent to the officers' warrantless
entry into his apartment. Thus, officers were not lawfully entitled to be where they were
at when they observed the items in "plain view" which provided the basis for the search
warrant of Mr. Mangum's apartment. (8/3/10 Tr., p.45, Ls.1 0-15 (Testimony from Boise
City Detective Justin Kendall that he could not see items on the kitchen table from
outside of the apartment through the open front door).) Accordingly, the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Mangum respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
denying his motion to dismiss and remand his case to the district court for the entry of
an order dismissing the instant matter with prejudice. Alternatively, Mr. Mangum asks
that this Court vacate the district court's order denying his motion to suppress and
remand his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 20 th day of December, 2011.

ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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